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1. INTRODUCTION 
It has been argued in the economic literature, e.g., Georgescu-Roegen 
[9, lo], Armstrong [I], Quandt [19], Davidson-Marschak [6], Block- 
Marschak [5], Marschak [16], Mossin l-171, etc., that, if economic agents 
reveal at all a certain consistency of behavior, this consistency is at best 
of a probabilistic nature. For example, Block-Marschak remarked in 
[5, p. 971 that “in interpreting human behavior there is a need to substitute 
“stochastic consistency of choices” for “absolute consistency of choices.” 
The latter is usually assumed in economic theory but is not well supported 
by experience. It is, in fact, not assumed in empirical econometrics and 
psychology.” 
In consumption theory, “stochastic consistency” means that, given a 
subset Tin the commodity space Rz (e.g., a budget-set) there is for certain 
subsets S in T a probability that an individual chooses a commodity- 
vector in S if he could choose in the set T. In particular, for two 
commodity-vectors x and y there is a probability that x is preferred to y. 
However, these “choice probabilities” do not provide an adequate basic 
concept of a theory of stochastic choice. One may argue that the reason 
for the choice probabilities not being zero or one is that the “taste” of the 
agents depend on random factors. Therefore, the “taste” itself should be 
considered as probabilistic and the choice probabilities should be derived 
from the “random taste”. In this note, we shall give a precise meaning to 
the intuitive concept of “stochastic consistency of choices” by 
introducing “random preferences”, which are defined as random elements 
in the space of preferences. 
Clearly, the demand function of an economic agent with random 
preferences is a random function. Consequently, given the price-vector p, 
* This paper was written while the author was visiting Stanford University. 
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the total excess demand Se(p) of an economy 8, where the agents have 
random preferences, is a random vector. 
In this paper we shall study the random total excess demand in the case 
of a pure exchange economy. 
ANDOM PREFERENCES AND RANDOM DEMAND FUNCTIONS 
In traditional microeconomic theory, an economic agent-in a pure 
exchange economy with 1 commodities-is described by his ~on~u~~t~~~ 
set X, a closed subset of the commodity space F, his preferences 5, a 
continuous complete preordering on X, and his initial endowments e, a 
vector in RE. The behavior of an agent in a given choice situation is 
derived from these characteristics: if the price-vector p prevails, the agent 
is supposed to choose a greatest element for 5 in his budget set 
(xEX/p*x <p*e}. 
Let denote the set of all continuous complete preorderings. 
Since a binary relation 5 on a subset X of Rz is defined by its graph 
((x, z) E X x X / x 5 z}, the set P is nothing else than a collection of 
closed subsets in RE x RI, namely, the subsets which are the graph 
continuous complete preordering. We denote the generic element in 
5 ; hence, we denote the relation and its graph by the same symbol, i.e., 
we write x 5 2 or (x, z) E 5. Given the preference relation 5 
in P, one obtains the corresponding consumption set X by projec- 
tion; X = (x E Rz 1(x, x) E 51. 
With this notation, the characteristics-needs, tastes a 
of an economic agent are described by a point in the set 
“‘Common experience suggests, and experiment 
person does not always make the same choice when faced with the same 
options, even when the circumstances of choice seem in all relevant 
respects to be the same.“1 In order to take this fact into account we 
generalize the standard concept of an economic agent by consideri 
“random preferences” which are defined as random elements in the se 
of preferences. 
There is, however, a small but important, technical point. How do we 
define a random element in P? 
It has been shown by Y. Kannai [12] and G. Debreu [7] that the set 
of preferences can be endowed with’s metric such that agents with similar 
preferences (with respect to the metric) behave similarly in similar situa- 
tions (e.g., in similar wealth-price situations). 
lDavidson-Marschak [6], p. 233. 
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The set P of preferences endowed with the “topology of closed con- 
vergence” (see Appendix 1) becomes a separable metric space and the 
demand ~(5, e, p) of an agent is an upper hemicontinuous correspondence 
with respect to variations in all variables, the preferences 5, the endow- 
ments e, and the prevailing price-system p (for a rigourous statement, see 
Appendix 2). 
Now, where the set P of preferences is a metric space, what is meant by a 
random preference relation is clear, i.e., a probability on the Bore1 subsets 
of P, or, alternatively, a measurable mapping 01 of a probability space 
(0, .F, P) into P. Hence for every Bore1 subset G of P the set 
(w E Q 1 CX(W) E G) = C+(G) belongs to 9. As we shall see, the relevant 
information is contained in the distribution of the random variable. The 
number P(c+(G)) is interpreted as the probability that the observed 
behavior of an agent with random preferences 01 can be derived from a 
preference relation belonging to the set G. 
The description of an economic agent by a random element in P is what 
we called in the introduction “stochastic consistency of choices.” As a 
consequence, the behavior of an agent with random preferences is, in 
general, not “rational” in the traditional sense. Let 01 be a random pre- 
ference relation and X, y two commodity-vectors. One can show that the 
set {w E S 1 x &tw, y} belongs to @. Therefore, the probability 
P{w E Q j x &j $ is defined. We denote this probability by P(x $ y}; 
it may be any number between zero and one. 
Remark. The concept of random preferences, as defined above, makes 
precise and generalizes the idea of “random utilities” introduced by 
L. L. Thurstone [20] in 1927. In order to show this connection, we choose 
in P a subset PX which consists of all preference relations with the same 
connected domain X. Let u be a function of PX x Xinto R such that (i) for 
given 5 in P, , the function u&) : X -+ R is a Paretian utility for 5 and 
(ii) for given x E X, the function u(., x): PX -+ R’is Borel-measurable. As 
Aumann [2] has shown, such a joint utility function exists. 
Now, let 01 be a random preference relation. Then the function ~(a(.), x) 
of Q into R is the “random utility” of the commodity-vector x. If x and y 
are two commodity-vectors, then the distribution of the random utility 
vector (~(a, x), U(DI, y)) allows us to calculate the probability P (x 5, y>. 
This calculation becomes particularly simple if one assumes, as has been 
done by Thurstone, that the two random variables ~(a, X) and U(OL, y) are 
stochastically independent and that they have the same normal distribution. 
The connection of Thurstone’s random utility model with other pro- 
babilistic models of choice has been investigated by J. Marschak [16] and 
Block-Marschak [5]. See also the survey paper by Lute in [15]. 
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EXAMPLE. Consider two commodities and an agent who chooses 
only consumption plans (x1 , x2) for which either x1 or x2 is zero (he never 
consumes both commodities together). Assume free disposal of both 
commodities and that there is a frequency rr, 0 < z- < 1, with which. the 
agent chooses the first commodity. This behavior can be described by the 
following random preference relation: 52 = {w,, wz>, P(wJ = r, P(o,) = 
1 - 7~. The preference relation SW, is defined by (xi , xz) &, (yl , yJ if 
and only if x1 < y1 and the preference relation SW,, is defined 
(x1 , x2) SW, ( yr , yz) if and only if x2 < ye . A random &ility function u 
may be defined by 
4w, 6% 3 x2>> = 1”;; 
if w  = wl) 
if w  = we + 
This agent is in no sense “stochastic transitive”, for various definitions, 
see Marschak [16 p. 3181. For example, if rr = $, it is not true, in general, 
that P{x 5 y} > , 4 and P( y 5 z} > 4 implies P(x 5 z> > 8 (choose 
x = (3,3), y = (4, l), z = (2, 2)). Also we note that our random be- 
havior does not obey Axiom 1 of Lute [14, p. 61. Thus our agent violates 
axioms which have been suggested as criterion for “‘rationality”. Let us 
examine what is “irrational” in the behavior of our agent. 
Let w  be the income of the agent. If the price-vector (pl , pJ prevails, 
the agent will choose either (w/pJ of commodity 1 or (w/pJ of commodity 
2. Hence his demand function is a random function: 
(P, )w , 0 with probability 7~ 
dW,P) = 
i 1 
0, c with probability 1 - 7r. 
The expected demand function is given by 
f(w, P> = (y 7 y). 
Hence, on the average, the agent behaves like one who has the (deter- 
ministic) Cobb-Douglas utility u(xl , x,) = x,” * x;-. The average 
behavior of our random agent is “rational” in the best economic tradition 
Given a price-vector p, p E RL, the demand of an agent with random 
preferences 01 and wealth w  will also be random. We denote by ~(5, w, p) 
the set of greatest elements for 5 in the budget set (x E X / p * x < tv>* 
Thus ~(a(.), w, p) denotes the random demand of an agent with characteris- 
tics 01 and w  if the price-vector p prevails. For an agent in a pure exchange 
economy the wealth is given by the value of his endowments. 
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An economic agent with random characteristics (random agent, for 
short) in a pure exchange economy is a random variable with values in 
the space of agents’ characteristics A = P x Rz, i.e., a measurable 
mapping of a probability space (G’, F, P) into A. We leave open at this 
point the question whether the endowments of a random agent are random 
or deterministic. Typically, we think of a random agent as one with random 
preferences and nonrandom endowments. Since, formally, there is no 
difference, we treat the more general case where both preferences and 
endowments can be random. The random demand of a random agent 01 is 
denoted by ~(a(+), p), when p is the prevailing price-vector. We shall now 
study the expected demand of a random agent. 
To make the exposition as simple as possible, we make the following 
ASSUMPTION. Let Q denote the set of complete continuous pre- 
orderings defined on the positive orthant R: which are monotonic2 and 
strongly convex3. Let T be a closed and bounded subset of the strictly 
positive orthant of Rz. In what follows, we exclusively consider random 
agents whose distribution is concentrated on the set Q x T. 
PROPOSITION 1. Let 01 be a random agent whose distribution p is 
concentrated on. Q x T. The expected demand function f, , de$ned for 
every price-vector p > 0 by 
has the following properties: 
(9 U~P) = f,(~)f or every h > 0, andp *f,(p) =p * J proj, dp, i.e., 
the value of expected demand equals the value of expected 
endowments. 
(proj, denotes the projection of P x Rz onto Rz), 
(ii) the expected d emand function f, is continuous at every price- 
vector p > 0, 
(iii) vtp;,p, where p, > 0 andp # 0 but not strictly positive, then 
-+co 
(1 x I denote: td sum over the coordinates of x, x E R:). 
Proof. For every a E Q x T and p > 0 the demand y(a, p) consists of 
exactly one vector and we have q(a, p) = v(a, hp), A > 0, and 
p * y(a, p) = p * proj,(a). Since T is bounded and p > 0, the function 
2 i.e., x < z and x # z imply x < z. 
3i.e.,x~zandx$;zimply/\x+(1-~)z~xforeveryXwithO<h<1. 
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I&., p) of Q x T into RE is bounded. Further, according to Appendix 2, 
p(., p) is continuous. Hence the integral S y(., p) dp is defined and has 
clearly property (i). 
Let (pn) be a sequence converging top > 0. According to Appendix 2, 
for every a E Q x T, the sequence (~(a, p,)), converges to ~(a, p). Since 
the sequence (cp(., p,J) of functions is bounded, the Theorem of Lebesgue 
implies lim, j cp(., pn) dp = J q(., p) dp, which proves property (ii). 
Finally, the property (iii) follows from Fatou’s Lemma. In fact, we have 
and the monotonicity of the preferences implies lim inf, j ?(a9 p,)i = co. 
Let d denote the price-simplex {p E Rz j p 3 0, Ck=, pA = l} and 
Rz u {co} the one-point compactification of Ri. The space RE b (00) is se 
compact metric space. We denote by D the set of functions f of n into 
Rk u (co> such thatfis continuous andp > 0 if and only iff(p) E RE. 
It follows from Proposition 1 that the expected demand functionf, for 
every measure p on Q x T can be considered as a function in D. In fact, 
for p not strictly positive, we definef,(p) = co. 
We endow D with the topology of uniform convergence (with respect 
to the compact metric space Rz u {co}!). It is well-known that D is a 
separable metric space and a sequence (fJ converges to f in D if and only 
if for every sequence (pn) converging top in n it follows that (fn(pn))n=l, ... 
converges tof(p) in Rz U {co). 
Let &(Q x T) denote the set of probability measures on 
endowed with the weak topology (see Appendix 3). If p is a measure of 
M(Q x T) we denote byf, the expected demand function considered as 
an element in D. 
PROPOSITION 2. The mapping p -+ f, of A’(Q x T) into D is continuous. 
Proof. Let (p,) be a sequence converging weakly to p in J&Q x r). 
We have to show that (&(p,~) converges tot(p) for every sequence (p,) 
converging to p in d. 
Assume first p > 0. Since y(an , pn) converges to q(a, p) whenever (a?,) 
converges to a (Appendix 2), and since the sequence y(.,p,) of functions 
is bounded, the weak convergence of (pa) implies 14, Theorem 5.5, p. 341 
that lim, j &., pn) dpn = J p(., p) dp , Hence lim,,&(pJ = fn(p). Assume 
now that p is not strictly positive. SincefU(p) = co, we have to show that 
fu,(pn) tends to infinity. Let k be an integer and define u:(a) = 
mink I da, P,)I>. F or every sequence (a,) converging to a in x Twe 
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have I da, , PJI -+ 03 and, consequently, lim, r&a,) = k. Hence the 
weak convergence of the sequence &,) implies lim, s vtdpfi = k. Since 
for every k we have 
if y2 is sufficiently large, it follows that the sequence f,%(pJ is unbounded. 
Q.E.D. 
3. TOTAL EXCESS DEMAND OF RANDOM PURE EXCHANGE ECONOMIES 
A random pure exchange economy is a finite family of random agents, 
i.e., a finite family of P x Rz-valued random variables. 
Let 8 = (olJiGl be a random economy. Consider the total excess demand 
& , which for the price-vector p and the sample w  E Sz is given by 
Sdw, P) = C [~(ai(w), P) - proL(4~))l. 
&I 
It is clear that there does not exist, in general, an equilibrium price- 
vector p* in the sense that with probability one the economy 8 is in 
equilibrium, i.e., 
However, the random total excess demand is the sum of the individual 
random excess demands !&(., p) = ~(a~(.), p) - proj,(ol,(.)). If we assume 
that the family {ai> of random variables is stochastically independent, 
then the family of individual excess demands in stochastically independent 
too. We consider now a sequence 6, = {LX&~, , n = I,... of economies 
wherewith increasing n the number #I, of participants tends to infinity. 
Then we seek conditions on the sequence (8,) which imply the law of 
large numbers for the sequence of excess demands, i.e., conditions which 
imply that the normalized sequence 
SB,L P) - -%,,L P)) 
#In 
converges in probability to zero.. Since we are not interested in the total 
excess demand per capita centered at expectation but in the total excess 
demand per capita itself we wish to choose for every economy 8, a price- 
vector & such that expected total excess demand with respect to p, is zero. 
The simplest sufficient conditions such that the sequence lgpn(., &)(l/#I,) 
of total excess demands per capita converges in probability to zero is that 
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the individual excess demands C,$., jQ are uniformly bounded. This is 
trivially the case when all price-vectors pn belong to a closed subset of the 
strongly positive price-simplex and when all endowment vectors belong 
to a bounded set. 
THEOREM I. Let 8, = {~ly)~~~, , n = l,..., be a sequence of ec~n~~i~~ 
mch that 
(a) #a,-+ coforn- co, 
(p> for every n, the family (oI;)~~~, is stochastically independent, 
(y) there is a weakly compact set in &( x T) which contains 
every distribution of LX; , i E I, , n = I ,.... 
Then f%r every economy 8% there exists a price-vector jin > 0 such that 
(1) expected total excess demand of gti with respect to pn is zero, i.e., 
(2) total excess demand per capita of ~8’~ with respect to jjn converges in 
probability to zero, i.e., for every 6 > 0, 
Proof. For every agent CX~ , i E I,, n = I,..., we denote by fin the 
expected demand function and by ep the expected endowments. Let 
8% = (A”, eFjiEI, denote the pure exchange economy, where every agent 
i E I, is described by his demand function and endowments. 
According to Debreu 17, p. 3901 and our Proposition 1, there exists 
a price-equilibrium Pn > 0 for the economy c?~ , i.e., 
This clearly implies assertion (1). 
It is well-known (see, e.g., Lobve [13, p. 317~) that the sequence 
converges in probability to zero if the summands Q(., j?,), i E I;, , n = I,... 
are uniformly bounded. Hence it remains to show that every limit point 
of the sequence (pn) is strictly positive. 
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It follows from assumption (r) and Proposition 2 that there is a compact 
subset C in the space of demand functions D such that every expected 
demand functionfi” belongs to C. Every economy G?~ can be described by 
a probability measure v, on C x T. The measure v, is defined as the 
uniform distribution over the finite set (f:, e;}i,l, . Since C x T is a 
compact metric space, the set of all probability measures on C x T 
endowed with the weak topology is compact (Parthasarathy [18, 
Theorem 6.4., p. 451). Hence we can assume without loss of generality that 
the sequence (v,) is weakly converging to a measure v on C x T and the 
sequence (&) is converging to p. Assume that p is not strictly positive. 
Since C is compact, one can easily show that inf,,, If(&)1 tends to 
infinity. Hence infk IfhJl d .h- lf&)l dv, = J&T I pwi, I dv, , 
where proj, denotes the projection of C x T onto T. 
The left side of the inequality tends to infinity but 
lip 
s 
1 proj, I dv, = 1 j proj, I dv, 
which is finite. Q.E.D. 
Remark. Instead of applying the law of large numbers to the sequence 
of excess demands one may try to apply the central limit theorem. Thus 
consider the sequence (l/V/#&,) <&,(., &) and ask for possible limit 
distributions. Under the assumptions of Theorem 1 the individual excess 
demands are uniformly bounded and, consequently, if, in fact, the se- 
quence co,(., pa) converges in distribution, the limit distribution is 
normal. This follows from Loeve [12, p. 3161 and the Cramer-Wald 
Device [3, p. 481. In order to obtain a converging sequence (I/ ~‘#a,) 
cs,(., &) of normalized total excess demand, we have to assume that the 
sequence (&J of economies increases in some regular way. Since every 
random agent is described by a measure on the space Q x T of characteris- 
tics, the random economy ~7~ is described by a measure v, on the space 
J&‘(Q x T) of measures on Q x T. If the sequence (a,) of random 
economies is such that the corresponding sequence (v,) of measures on 
J&‘(Q x T) is weakly convergent, then it follows that the sequence 
U/2/#~?J t,c, AL) is convergent in distribution and the limit distribution 
is normal. For a more detailed discussion we refer to a forthcoming paper 
by Bhattacharya and Majumdar. 
4. STEADILY INCREASING ECONOMIES 
In this section we study again the random excess demand of a large 
random economy but from a different point of view. 
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A random economy 8’ = {oli}ioI at a given sample w  E Q is the family 
(oz~(w)& of points in the space A = P x R’ of agents’ charateristics. 
consider the distribution in A of these points, i.e., the probability measure 
where 6, denotes the probability measure concentrated on the point IE and 
#I denotes the cardinality of the set I. The random measure v&.) describes 
the distribution of agents’ characteristics in the economy d for every 
sample w. We call v~(w) the sample distribution of the random economy 
6 for the sample w. 
We shall now show that for certain large random economies the sample 
distribution is “approximately” independent of the particular sample, or, 
in other words, for large random economies the individual randomness is 
negligible where the distribution of agents’ characteristics is concerned. 
Consider a sequence (a,), = (fan}& of random economies. Let 
(pl , ,u~ ,...I be a countable set of measures on A-the distributions of 
random variables $--and define CF as the number of agents 
economy 6n whose distribution is equal to ,Q . Two agents are sai 
of the same (probabilistic) type if they are equally distributed. 
The sequence (&J of economies is called steadily increasing if 
(i) the number #&n of participants in 8% is strictly increasing with n, 
(ii) the number C,” is nondecreasing with n, the Iimits 
$tlJ -& = CI, 
exist and CzSI ck = 1. 
The measure v on A defined by 
is called the asymptotic distribution of the sequence (&‘n>. 
THEOREM 2. Let (&J be a steadily increasing sequence of random 
economies. If in every economy ~9~ , the random agents of the same proba- 
bilistic type are stochastically independent, then the sequence (Y~,(w))~-~, ... 
of sample distributions converges in probability to the asymptotic distribution 
v = CT=‘=, ckpk , i.e., for every E > 0, 
PbJ E Q I P(v8sP,(~>, 4 > 4 2 0, 
where p denotes a metric for the weak topology on .4!(A). 
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Proof. First, in addition to the assumptions made in the theorem, we 
assume that an agent E who belongs to the economy rzYn also belongs to 
8;, for all m > ~1. Hence, there is a countable set (c&,, of random agents 
and an increasing sequence of finite sets I, C N such that &% = {i~~}~~~, .
Note, in the theorem we allow that an agent 01 who belongs to &n is 
replaced in 8m by an agent 0~’ provided the random agents E and 0~’ have 
the same distribution, i.e., the agents are of the same probabilistic type. 
We shah now prove that with probability one the sequence (v~~(w))~=~,... 
of sample distributions converges weakly to the asymptotic distribution v. 
Let h be a bounded and continuous function of A into R. First we shall 
show that almost surely in 9, 
By definition of the sample distribution v8,(o), ‘we have 
where 1,” = (i E I, 1 P 0 a;’ = pk}. 
For every k, the limit limtiim (l/#ISk) zipI k h(c+(o)) almost surely 
exists. In fact, if k is such that the sequence (#I>)C>n=l,... tends to infinity, 
then the strong law of large numbers implies that there is a subset J&,, 
with probability one such that for each 
Since by assumption ck: = lim, (#I,“/#&) for every k and cz=‘=, ck = 1, 
and since the function h is bounded, it follows that 
If (#Lk>n=l,... does not tend to infinity, one has ck = 0. 
Hence 
li? j h dv8,(w) = 2 ck f  h dprc = j h dv for every w  E J& = fi Q-2,,. 
k=l k=l 
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Since the space A is separable, there is (Parthasarathy [88, Theorem 6.6, 
p. 471) a sequence (I&) of continuous and bounded functions such that a 
sequence of measures on A converges weakly if and only if the integrals 
over the functions h, are convergent. Thus we have only a countable union 
of null sets and, consequently, we have shown that with probabihty one 
the sequence of sample distributions converges to Y. 
Let p denote a bounded metric for the weak topology on ./Z(A). Since 
the space of probability measures on the separable space A is itself separa- 
ble, the mapping p(~&,(.), V) of Q into R is measurable. The sequence 
(P(v,,C& vNm=~..., b is ounded and converges almost surely to zero. Hence 
Let now the sequence (JQ of economies be as in the Theorem. If we 
replace the random variable E in J?% by 01’, which has the same distribution 
as 01, then, we do not change the distribution of the random measure 
ygn(.). Hence the integral Jn p(v,, , V) dP is not changed. Since we showed 
that lim, JL ptvB, , V) dP = 0, it follows that the sequence v&, of sample 
distributions converges in probability to v. 
THEOREM 3. Let (&‘> be a steadily increasing sequence 5f random 
economies where every distribution is concentrated on the set 
Assume that in every economy ~9~ the agents of the same type are stochas- 
tically independent. Then for every economy gn there is a price-vector pn 
such that expected total excess demand with respect to jin is zero, every 
limit point p of the sequence Pn is a price-equilibrium ~‘r the asymptotic 
distribution v, and total excess demand per capita of CT,, with respect to pra 
converges in probability to zero. 
Proof. The existence of the price-vectors j& has been established in 
Theorem II. Hence, there exists for every economy (gn) a price-vector 
&, E d, & > 0, such that 
(I) the total expected excess demand in 8, with respect to j& is zero, 
i.e., -WL$., Pn)l = 0. 
We shall now show that 
(2) every limit point p of the sequence &) is strictly positive. 
By (I), we obtain Cz=‘=, CF(f&Q - eb) = 0, where fk (resp., e3 denotes 
the .expected demand function (resp., endowments) corresponding to the 
b/3/4-6 
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distribution run . By assumption cz = (Ct/#&,) tends to ck and at least 
one of the ck’s, say cj, is not zero. Hence 
k=l 
k#j 
k=l 
The right side is bounded from above. Therefore property (iii) of Proposi- 
tion 1 implies (2). 
Next we show that 
(3) if (&) tends to p, then total demand per capita J v(., pm) dv,% of 
the random economy 8% converges in probability to J” F(., p) dv, the total 
demand of the limit economy v. 
It suffices to show that every subsequence of (J y(., &) dv8:s)nx1,... has 
a subsequence which converges almost surely to J v(., p) dv. 
According to Theorem 2, every subsequence of v8% converges in pro- 
bability to V. Consequently, there is a subsequence (vtP ),=1,... which 
converges almost surely to v. Since the demand function 2is continuous 
with respect to variations in tastes, wealth and prices (Appendix 2), it 
follows that for every sequence (a,) converging to a in Q x T the sequence 
(74% 3 Pn$)a=1,... converges to ~(a, p). Furthermore, the sequence v(., p,), 
of functions is bounded. Hence, according to Billingsley [4, Theorem 5.5, 
p. 341, a.e. in 9, 
Ii,“- s q4, E-J dvcRnp(w) = / d-, P) dvv. 
(4) If (@a) tends to p, then p is an equilibrium price-vector for the 
asymptotic distribution v. 
In fact, it follows from (2) and (3) that the sequence of total excess demand 
per capita with respect to p, is bounded and converges in probability to 
J ((., p) - proj,) dv. Using Lebesgue’s Theorem, we obtain 
lip E [s (&, P,J - pwL> dv&%] = E [/ (de, P) - w?LJ dv] 
= 
s 
Cd., a> - ProjJ dv. 
Since the expected total excess demand ofgn with respect to p, is zero, we 
have l(y(.,p) - proj,) dv = 0, i.e., p is a price-equilibrium for the 
measure v.. 
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One can easily verify that (3) and (4) imply 
(5) total excess demand per capita of G, with respect to pn converges 
in probabihty to zero. 
Remark. An alternative way to define equilibria for random economies 
is to consider “random prices” instead of deterministic price-vectors. 
If G = {E&l is a random economy, then a random equilibrium price- 
vector p is a random R”-valued variable (i.e., a measurable mapping of 
(Q, %-, B) into RI) such that for every sample o E Qn, a(o) is an ~qui~ibrinm 
price-vector for the (deterministic) economy (oli(w)jiE1 * We denote by 
z-&w) the set of equilibrium price-vectors for the economy (ai(w)jiGl, 
If the random economy d = (aijiGl is such that all random agents 
have their characteristics in the set Q x T, then, for every sample w  E 
the set ~~(0) is nonempty and compact. Using the Measurable Selection 
Theorem, one can show that there exists a random equilibrium priee- 
vector for the economy 8. If (gm) is a sequence of random economies as in 
Theorem 2, then one can show that almost surely 
i.e., the limit points of the sequence (P%(W)) are independent of the sample 
wEa. 
1. CLOSED-CONVERGENCE OF SETS 
We denote by F the set of closed subsets of RI. Let (1”,) be a sequence 
in F. We denote by Lim Inf (-F,) the set of points x in biz such that every 
neighborhood of x intersects all the F, with sufficiently large YE and 
Lim Sup(F,) the set of points x in Ipl such that every neighborhood of x 
intersects infinitely many F, . 
The sequence (F,) has a limit F in the sense of the “‘closed-convergence” 
if 
Lim Inf F, = F = Lim Sup E;, . 
(1) There is a metric on F such that F becomes a separable space 
ond the metric-convergence and closed-convergence coincide. 
For details see [ll] and the references therein. 
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2. CONTINUITY OF THE DEMAND CORRESPONDENCE 
The following result, due to Debreu [7], shows that similar agents 
(with respect to the metric on the space A of agents’ characteristics) 
behave similarly in similar situations: 
(2) Let the subset M of A x Rt be such that for every (a, p) in M the 
consumption set X(a) is convex, & is a complete continuous preordering, 
the budget-set {x E X(a)1 p . x ,< p * e(a)} is compact, and inf 
p * X(a) <p . e(a). Then the demand correspondence y of M into Rt is 
upper hemicontinuous i.e., for every open set G containing q(a, p) there is a 
neighborhood V of (a, p) such that &a’, p’) C G for every (a’, p’) E V. 
In [7], Debreu uses a slightly different metric on the space A of agents’ 
characteristics. His proof, however, holds also for the metric used in this 
paper. For details see [ll, Appendix A]. 
3. WEAK TOPOLOGY ON THE SET OF PROBABILITY MEASURES 
ON A METRIC SPACE 
Let A4 denote a metric space and J%’ the set of all probability measures 
on M (see Billingsley [4, p. 71 or Parthasarathy [18, p. 261). A sequence 
(v,) of measure is said to converge weakly to v in J&? if Jfdvn converges to 
Jfdv for every bounded and continuous function f of M into R. 
(3) There is a topology on A, called the weak topology, such that a 
sequence (vJ converges with respect to the topology tf and only zf it con- 
verges weakly. If the metric space M is separable, the weak topology is 
separable and metrizable. Furthermore, zf A4 is compact, then A? with the 
weak topology is compact. 
For details see Billingsley [4, Appendix III] or Parthasarathy [18, 
Chap. II]. 
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